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IN.THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
LUCKY SEVEN RODEO CORPORATION, 
A UTAH CORPORATION, 
PLAINTIFF I APPELLANT, 
-vs-
PAT CLARK, 
AN INDIVIDUAL, 
DEFENDANT & RESPONDENT. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN ORDERING AND 
DECLARING THE EASEMENT GRANTED TO APPELLANT BY STIPU-
LATION OF THE PARTIES TERMINATED AMD OF NO FURTHER 
FORCE AND EFFECT AMD THAT APPELLANT HAD NO FURTHER 
INTEREST IN THE REAL PROPERTY BELONGING TO RESPONDENT 
UPON WHICH SAID EASEMENT WAS GRANTED, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
ON MARCH 13, 1981 THE APPELLANT BROUGHT ACTION 
AGAINST THE RESPONDENT IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY CLAIMING TITLE TO 5.815 ACRES 
OF REAL PROPERTY LOCATED IN WASHINGTON COUNTY, UTAH 
(R. 1-4). LEGAL TITLE TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTY STOOD 
IN THE NAME OF THE RESPONDENT PAT CLARK (R, 152). 
THE COMPLAINT OF THE APPELLANT SET FORTH TWO THEO-
RIES UPON WHICH APPELLANT CLAIMED TITLE TO THE SUBJECT 
SUPREME COURT NO. 
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ESENCE (R. 1-2) AND (2) ADVERSE POSSESSION (R. 2-3). 
IT IS TO BE NOTED THAT AT NO PLACE IN THE COMPLAINT 
DID THE APPELLANT CLAIM ANY EASEMENT ON OR ACROSS THE 
SUBJECT PROPERTY (R. 1-4). 
THE RESPONDENT ANSWERED THE COMPLAINT OF THE APPE-
LLANT BY GENERALLY DENYING THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE APPEL-
LANT (R. 7-8) AND COUNTERCLAIMED REQUESTING A DECREE 
OF THE COURT QUIETING TITLE IN RESPONDENT TO THE SUBJECT 
REAL ESTATE AND FOR DAMAGES (R. 8-11). AFTER WHAT 
CAN BE TERMED THE USUAL PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY AND MANUVER-
ING THE MATTER WENT TO JURY TRIAL BEFORE THE TRIAL 
COURT ON THE 14TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 1983 (R. 143). 
AFTER APPROXIMATELY TWO AND ONE-HALF DAYS OF TRIAL 
THE PARTIES SETTLED THE ISSUES EXISTING BETWEEN THEM. 
THE AGREEMENT SETTING FORTH THE SETTLEMENT, INCLUDING 
THE SETTLEMENT OF ISSUES OUTSIDE THE PLEADINGS. WAS 
REDUCED TO WRITING IN AN INSTRUMENT ENTITLED "STIPULAT-
ION AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT" WAS EXECUTED BY THE PART-
IES AND THEIR COUNSEL ON JANUARY 30. 1984 AND WAS FILED 
WITH THE COURT ON FEBRUARY 13, 1984 (R. 152-155). 
OBVIOUSLY UPON SETTLEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND THE REPRE-
SENTATION OF SUCH TO THE TRIAL COURT THE COURT EXCUSED 
THE JURY AND THE LAWSUIT WAS TERMINATED PRIOR TO ITS 
COMPLETION AND THE RENDITION OF A JURY VERDICT (TR. 
330-331). THE VERBAL AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES WHICH 
WAS SUBSEQUENTLY REDUCED TO WRITING IS SET FORTH AT 
PAGES 325 - 329 OF VOLUME II OF THE TRIAL TRANSCRIPT. 
THE PROVISIONS OF THE PARTIES' SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
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WHICH ARE THE SUBJECT OF APPELLANT'S APPEAL ARE SET 
FORTH IN WRITING IN PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 2 OF THE PARTIES' 
STIPULATION AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT SHOWN AT PAGES 
152 AND 153 OF THE DISTRICT COURT RECORD. IN THE OPIN-
ION OF RESPONDENT, FOR PURPOSES OF THIS APPEAL THE 
IMPROTANT PROVISIONS ARE CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 2 AND 
IT READS AS FOLLOWS: 
"2. PLAINTIFF LUCKY SEVEN RODEO CORPORATION AND 
ITS SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS (HEREINAFTER "PLAINTIFF") 
SHALL HAVE AN EXCLUSIVE AND PERPETUAL EASEMENT TO USE, 
MAINTAIN AND OPERATE THE RESERVOIR AND DIKE AREA WHICH 
ARE DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE FOR IRRIGATION, 
STOCK WATERING, CORRALLING OF ANIMALS AND AGRICULTURAL 
PURPOSES, TOGETHER WITH THE OBLIGATION THAT PLAINTIFF 
(APPELLANT) SHALL MAINTAIN THE FENCES ENCLOSING THE 
AREA HEREINABOVE DESCRIBED." 
THE AFOREMENTIONED EASEMENT WAS CREATED 2Y AGREEMENT 
OF THE PARTIES ON THE REAL ESTATE WHICH APPELLANT ORIG-
INALLY CLAIMED TITLE TO HOWEVER UNDER THE TERMS OF 
THE PARTIES' AGREEMENT TITLE REMAINED IN THE NAME OF 
THE RESPONDEAT. 
IN CONFORMITY WITH THE PARTIES' STIPULATION AND 
AGREEMENT. MADE BOTH VERBALLY AND IN WRITING, THE COURT 
ENTERED ITS ORDER AND JUDGMENT PUTTING THE SANCTION 
AND AUTHORITY OF THE COURT BEHIND THE AGREEMENT ON 
FEBRUARY 13, 1984 (R. 156-159). IT IS TO BE NOTED 
THAT THE WORDING OF THE ORDER AND JUDGMENT IS ALMOST 
EXACTLY THE SAME AS THAT IN THE WRITTEN STIPULATION 
AND AGREEMENT. ALSO. 30TH THE WRITTEN STIPULATION 
AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (R. 152) AND THE ORDER AND 
JUDGMENT (R. 156) WERE PREPARED BY COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT 
USING WORDING CHOSEN BY HIM. 
n*. A.. **..__ o n <innr rk ** 
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APPELLANT HAD REMOVED AND DESTROYED THE RESERVOIR AND 
DIKE ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AND THEREFORE HAD DESTROYED 
THE NEED FOR ANY FURTHER EASEMENT AND INDICATED ITS 
INTENT TO ABANDON THE SAME AND FURTHER THAT THE APPELL-
ANT HAD FAILED TO MAINTAIN THE FENCES ON THE PROPERTY 
AND HAD IN FACT DESTROYED THE SAME, CONTRARY TO THE 
AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES AND THE ORDER OF THE COURT. 
(R. 164-165). THE APPELLANT MOVED TO DISMISS THE MOTION 
(R. 167-169) AND THE COURT OVERRULED AND DENIED THE 
MOTION TO DISMISS GIVING THE APPELLANT 20 DAYS TO ANSWER 
THE ORIGINAL MOTION (R. 170). ON SEPTEMBER 13, 1985 
THE RESPONDENT FILED HIS "MOTION FOR INTERPRETATION 
OF JUDGMENT AND FOR ORDER TERMINATING EASTMENT" (R. 
171-173) BASED UPON THE SAME REASONS AS THOSE SET FORTH 
IN ITS PREVIOUS MOTION THE SAME BEING THAT (1) THE 
APPELLANT HAD REMOVED AND DESTROYED THE RESERVOIR AND 
DIKE ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AND THEREFORE HAD DESTROYED 
THE REASON FOR ANY EASEMENT AND INDICATED ITS INTENT 
TO ABANDON THE SAME AND (2) THAT THE FENCES ON THE 
PROPERTY HAD BEEN REMOVED AND DESTROYED CONTRARY TO 
THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES AND ORDER OF THE COURT. 
THE APPELLANT ANSWERED THE MOTION BY ADMITTING THAT 
THE RESERVOIR AND DIKE HAD BEEN REMOVED (R. 177). 
THERE IS NOT ISSUE OF FACT IN THAT REGARD. IN ADDITION, 
THE RECORD INDICATES BY UNCONTROVERTED AFFIDAVIT (R. 
183) THAT THE FENCES HAD BEEN REMOVED AND DESTROYED 
BY THE APPELLANT. 
ON JANUARY 23, 1986 THE COURT ENTERED ITS SUMMARY 
I „ ^., C r m . r u r w T i i PpnriFFnTNfiS BASED UPON RESPON-
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DENT'S MOTIONS AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT THEREOF AND 
UPON APPELLANT'S ANSWER THERETO ORDERING THAT THE APP-
ELLANT'S EASEMENT BE EXTINGUISHED AND TERMINATED. 
THE COURT'S RATIONAL IN ENTERING SUCH AN ORDER WAS 
THAT THE APPELLANT HAD PERMENANTLY DESTROYED THE REASON 
FOR THE EXISTANCE OF THE EASEMENT BY THE DESTRUCTION 
AND REMOVAL OF THE RESERVOIR AND DIKE THEREBY SHOWING 
ITS INTENT TO ABANDON THE EASEMENT (R. 220-224). THE 
COURT ALSO FOUND ADDITIONAL REASON TO TERMINATE THE 
EASEMENT BASED UPON THE FACT THAT THE APPELLANT HAD 
FAILED TO MAINTAIN THE FENCES ON THE PROPERTY AS AGREED 
BY THE PARTIES AND ORDERED BY THE COURT AND IN FACT 
HAD REMOVED PART OF THE FENCES (R. 223). IN MAKING 
ITS ORDER NULLIFYING THE APPELLANT'S EASEMENT THE DIST-
RICT COURT POINTED OUT THE FOLLOWING: 
1. THAT THE APPELLANT HAD IN FACT VOLUNTARILY 
REMOVED THE DIKE AND RESERVOIR FROM THE SUBJECT PROPERTY 
THEREBY DESTROYING THE REASON FOR THE EASEMENT AND 
SHOWING ITS INTENT TO ABANDON THE SAME (R. 222). 
2. THAT THE APPELLANT HAD REMOVED PART OF THE 
FENCE SURROUNDING THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY IN VIOLATION 
OF THE PARTIES' AGREEMENT AND THE ORDER OF THE COURT. 
(R. 222). 
3. THAT BOTH THE "STIPULATION AND SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT" OF THE PARTIES AND THE "ORDER AND JUDGMENT" 
OF THE COURT HAD BEEN PREPARED BY COUNSEL FOR THE APP-
ELLANT AND THEREFORE IF ANY CONTROVERSY EXISTED AS 
TO ITS MEANING THAT IT WAS TO BE CONSTRUED IN FAVOR 
OF THE RESPONDENT AND AGAINST THE APPELLANT (R. 222). 
4. THAT THE COURT HAD HEARD THE TESTIMONY AND 
EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE TRIAL OF THE MATTER AND PRIOR 
TO THE TIME THE SETTLEMENT WAS REACHED AND WAS OF THE 
OPINION THAT THE REASON THE EASEMENT WAS GRANTED WAS 
TO ENABLE APPELLANT TO MAINTAIN SAID RESERVOIR AND 
DIKE FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE ABUTTING AGRICULTURAL PROP-
ERTY OWNED AND USED BY THE APPELLANT TO ENABLE THE 
SAME TO BE IRRIGATED AND FOR THAT PURPOSE ONLY (R. 
222-223). Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5. THAT THERE ORIGINALLY EXISTED A RESERVOIR 
AND DIKE ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY BUT THE APPELLANT 
HAD DESTROYED AND REMOVED THE SAME (R. 223). 
6. THAT BY THE DISTRUCTION OF SAID RESERVOIR 
AND DIKE THE APPELLANT HAD MANIFESTED ITS INTENT TO 
ABANDON ITS EASEMENT ALLOWING IT TO MAINTAIN THE SAME 
(R. 223). 
7. THAT THE SOLE REASON FOR THE GRANTING OF SAID 
EASEMENT WAS TO ENABLE APPELLANT TO USE AND MAINTAIN 
THE SAID RESERVOIR AND DIKE (R. 223). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
THE SOLE PURPOSE FOR THE GRANTING OF THE SUBJECT 
EASEMENT TO APPELLANT WAS TO ALLOW IT TO U_S£, MAINTAIN 
AND OPERATE THE RESERVOIR AND DIKE AREA UPON RESPOND-
ENT'S REAL PROPERTY TO ENABLE IT TO IRRIGATE REAL PROP-
ERTY OWNED BY IT ABUTTING THE SERVIENT PROPERTY. BY 
VOLUNTARILY DESTROYING AND REMOVING THE RESERVOIR AND 
DIKE THE APPELLANT DESTROYED ANY REASON FOR THE CONTIN-
UANCE OF THE EASEMENT AND INDICATED ITS INTENT TO ABAN-
DON THE SAME AND THE USE FOR WHICH IT WAS GRANTED. 
THE ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT IN DECLARING AN ABANDON-
MENT AND FORFEITURE AND TERMINATION OF THE EASEMENT 
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN ORDERING AND 
DECLARING THE EASEMENT GRANTED TO APPELLANT BY STIPULA-
TION OF THE PARTIES TERMINATED AND OF NO FURTHER FORCE 
AND EFFECT AND THAT APPELLANT HAD NO FURTHER INTEREST 
IN THE REAL PROPERTY BELONGING TO RESPONDENT AND UPON 
WHICH SAID EASEMENT WAS GRANTED. 
IN PRESENTING ITS ARGUMENT THE RESPONDENT WOULD 
REMIND THE READER THAT THE PARTIES SPENT APPROXIMATELY 
TWO AND ONE-HALF DAYS IN TRIAL PRESENTING TESTIMONY 
— ,.,,,_ P^HDT
 Drrnpr TH(TY FINALLY WERE 
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A3LE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT SETTLING THE CONTROVERSY 
BETWEEN THEM. THE TRIAL JUDGE HEARD THIS TESTIMONY 
AND EVIDENCE AS WELL AS THE STIPULATED SETTLEMENT BET-
WEEN THE PARTIES. IN MAKING ITS DETERMINATION THAT 
THE EASEMENT GRANTED TO APPELLANT SHOULD BE TERMINATED 
THE TRIAL COURT MADE CERTAIN DETERMINATIONS AND FINDINGS 
BASED UPON ITS KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS AND THE EVIDENCE 
AND TESTIMONY PRESENTED AT TRIAL. THESE FINDINGS ARE 
SET FORTH IN ORDER AND JUDGMENT ENTERED ON THE STIPU-
LATION AND ARE SET FORTH ABOVE INCLUDING THE FINDING 
THAT THE REASON THE EASEMENT WAS GRANTED TO APPELLANT 
WAS TO ENABLE IT TO iiS£, MAINTAIN AND OPERATE THE RESER-
VOIR AND DIKE AREA UPON RESPONDENT'S REAL PROPERTY 
FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE ABUTTING AGRICULTURAL PROPERTY 
OWNED AND USED BY APPELLANT AND TO ENABLE THE SAME 
TO BE IRRIGATED AND FOR THAT PURPOSE ONLY. IN ADDITION, 
THE TRIAL COURT DETERMINED THAT THE STIPULATION AND 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY THE PARTIES AND 
THE ORDER AND JUDGMENT ENTERED BY THE COURT WERE PREP-
ARED BY COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT AND THEREFORE IF ANY 
CONTROVERSY EXISTED AS TO THEIR MEANING THAT THEY MUST 
BE CONSTRUED IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO RESPONDENT 
AMD AGAINST APPELLANT. 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS STATED MANY TIMES THAT 
WHEN A MATTER IS PRESENTED TO IT FOR REVIEW THAT IT 
WILL VIEW THE EVIDENCE AND INFERENCES DRAWN THEREFROM 
IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE FINDINGS DRAWN BY 
THE TRIAL COURT. HARMON V. RASMUSSEN (1962) 13 UTAH Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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TRUST CO., (1955) 4 UTAH 2D 76. 286 P. 2D 1065- STATE 
v. BERCHTOLD (1960) 11 UTAH 2D 208. 357 P. 2D 183. 
IT IS SUBMITTED THAT A STUDY OF THE RECORD, BOTH IN 
THE PLEADINGS AND TRANSCRIPTS. WILL INDICATE ADEQUATE 
BASIS TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS AND DETER-
MINATIONS AS SET FORTH IN ITS ORDER TERMINATING THE 
APPELLANT'S EASEMENT. 
IT IS A WELL RECOGNIZED PRINCIPLE THAT AN EASEMENT 
MAY BE ABANDONED BY THE OWNER THEREOF. DAHNKEN V. 
GEORGE ROMNEY & SONS CO., ET AL.. (1947) 111 UTAH 471, 
184 P. 2D 211: WESTERN GATEWAY STORAGE CO. V. TRESEDER 
(UTAH 1977) 567 P. 2D 181; WHITESIDES V. GREEN. 13 
UTAH 341. 44 P. 1032: TUTTLE V. SOWADZKI, 41 UTAH 501, 
126 P. 959; HARMON V. RASUMSSEN (1962) 13 UTAH 2D 422, 
375 P. 2D 762. AN EASEMENT MAY BE EXTINGUISHED BY 
AN ACT OF THE OWNER OF THE EASEMENT WHICH IS INCOMPAT-
IBLE WITH THE EXISTANCE OF THE RIGHT CLAIMED. IF THE 
OWNER OF THE EASEMENT HIMSELF OBSTRUCTS IT IN A MANNER 
INCONSISTANT WITH ITS FUTURE ENJOYMENT, OR PERMITS 
THE OWNER OF THE SERVIENT ESTATE TO DO SO. THE EASEMENT 
WILL BE CONSIDERED ABANDONED. BROWN V. OREGON SHORT 
LINE R. CO. (1909) 36 UTAH 257, 102 P. 740. IN THE 
BROWN CASE, SUPRA, THE UTAH SUPREME COURT IN QUOTING 
PREVIOUS AUTHORITY SAID AS FOLLOWS! 
"(1) THAT A SERVITUDE (EASEMENT) IS EXTINGUISHED 
BY ANY OBSTRUCTION OF A PERMANENT NATURE BY THE PARTY 
HIMSELF TO WHOM THE SERVITUDE IS DUE (OR BY HIS CONSENT) 
OR BY THE VOLUNTARY ACQUISITION OR ACCEPTANCE OF ANY 
OTHER RIGHT OR PRIVILEGE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE EXERCISE 
OR ENJOYMENT OF IT: AND (2) THAT BEING ONCE LOST IS 
GONE FOREVER, AND CAN NEVER BE REVIVED BUT BY A NEW 
GRANT." TAYLOR V. HAMPTON. 4 MCCORD (S.C.) 96. 17 
A.. n_„ 71 n 
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THE APPELLANT WAS GRANTED AN EASEMENT TO USE, 
MAINTAIN AND OPERATE THE "RESERVOIR AND DIKE" AREA 
UPON RESPONDENT'S REAL PROPERTY. THE TRIAL COURT DETER-
MINED THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE GRANT OF THE EASEMENT 
WAS TO ENABLE APPELLANT TO USE THE RESERVOIR AND DIKE 
TO IRRIGATE APPELLANT'S ABUTTING AGRICULTURAL LAND. 
WITH THE DISTINCTION AND REMOVAL OF THE RESERVOIR AND 
DIKE THE EASEMENT COULD NO LONGER BE USED FOR THE PURP-
OSE FOR WHICH ITS GRANT WAS INTENDED. 
IN HARMON V. RASMUSSEN, SUPRA, A FACT SITUATIN 
EXISTED WHEREIN RASMUSSEN OWNED AN IRRIGATION DITCH 
EASEMENT ACROSS HARMON'S LAND. HARMON BROUGHT AN ACTION 
TO QUIET THE TITLE TO HIS PROPERTY AS AGAINST THE EASE-
MENT CLAIMING THAT RASMASSEN HAD ABANDONED IT. THE 
FACTS INDICATED THAT RASMUSSEN HAD IN FACT PUT A LOAD 
OF EARTH AROUND A HEADGATE IN THE DITCH BUT HAD DONE 
NOTHING FURTHER TO INDICATE ABANDONMENT. THE ALLEGED 
PURPOSE OF THE EARTH AS PLACED WAS TO "PREVENT WATER 
BEING TURNED INTO THE DITCH BY CHILDREN". THE UTAH 
SUPREME COURT DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE TO FIND AN ABANDONMENT. 
THE CASE AT BAR IS MUCH DIFFERENT. AN EASEMENT 
WAS GRANTED TO USE, MAINTAIN AND OPERATE A RESERVOIR 
AND DIKE AREA UPON RESPONDENT'S LAND. THE RESERVOIR 
AND DIKE ALREADY EXISTED. ONE OF THE TERMS OF THE 
EASEMENT WAS THAT THE FENCES SURROUNDING THE SUBJECT 
REAL PROPERTY WOULD BE MAINTAINED BY THE GRANTEE OF 
THE EASEMENT (APPELLANT). APPELLANT NOT ONLY FAILED 
TO M A I M T A I M T u r rrKir>rc O U T n n m u r ^ - . . - * 
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ADDITION. WHILE THE APPELLANT WAS GIVEN AN EASEMENT 
AS AFORESAID TO "USE, MAINTAIN AND OPERATE" THE RESERV-
OIR AND DIKE ARE IT FOUND IT APPROPRIATE VOLUNTARILY 
DESTROY AND REMOVE THE RESERVOIR AND DIKE. IT WOULD 
BE ASSUMED SUCH DISTRUCTION AND REMOVAL WOULD BE OF 
A PERMENANT NATURE THEREBY INDICATING AN INTENT TO 
ABANDON THAT USE FOR WHICH THE EASEMENT WAS GRANTED. 
THE EASEMENT GRANTED TO APPELLANT CANNOT BE EN-
LARGED OR ITS USE CHANGED BY THE ACTS OF THE APPELLANT. 
IN ADDITION, ONCE THE GRANT OF EASEMENT IS LOST IT 
CAN NEVER BE REVIVED EXCEPT BY A NEW GRANT. 
CONCLUSION 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. 
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